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This paper investigates how the entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI)
aﬀects the aﬃliate R&D activities using unique data on Swedish multinational ﬁrms
over a long period of time (1970 to 1998). On average, acquired aﬃliates are more
likely to do R&D and have a higher level of R&D intensity than aﬃliates created
by greenﬁeld entry. This diﬀerence in observed R&D is explained by diﬀerences in
parent, aﬃliate, industry and country characteristics as well as by diﬀerent reactions
to these characteristics, as predicted by the recent theoretical literature on interna-
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11 Introduction
An increasing share of foreign direct investments (FDI) is now taking place in the form
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A).1 The increase in FDI through foreign
acquisitions has raised some concerns for policy-makers. Governments tend to be sceptical
towards foreign takeovers of domestic ﬁrms, in particular when the acquired domestic
ﬁrms are endowed with technological assets.2 There is a fear that the innovative activity
of the acquired ﬁrms will be reduced or shut down, thereby depriving the local economy of
strategic technologies and technological spillovers. While many countries encourage inﬂows
of greenﬁeld FDI (start-ups), restrictions on foreign acquisitions of domestic ﬁrms are
common (Mattoo et al., 2004). Greenﬁeld investments are then seen as having a positive
impact on host countries by, for instance, developing new research and development (R&D)
capacity in the host country and creating technological spillover beneﬁts.
Motivated by these concerns, we investigate empirically whether the choice of entry
mode of FDI, that is M&A or greenﬁeld entry, is of importance for aﬃliate R&D activities.
To this end, we use unique data on aﬃliates of Swedish multinational ﬁrms collected by the
Research Institute of Industrial Economics. Controlling for parent-, aﬃliate-, industry-
and country characteristics, we ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ta c q u i r e da ﬃliates are, on average, more
likely to do R&D and have a higher level of R&D intensity than aﬃliates created by
greenﬁeld investments. These results persist over time and with the age of aﬃliates, as
well as for diﬀerent ﬁrm types and industries. Our ﬁndings thus suggest that discrimi-
nating against cross-border acquisitions in order to promote greenﬁeld investments may
be counter-productive for a host country aiming at increasing R&D investments through
inﬂows of FDI.
Having found that acquired aﬃliates on average have both a higher propensity to
1M&As accounted for approximately 80% of all FDI transactions over the 1990’s.
2For instance, the rumors about a takeover bid of the French dairy producer Danone by the American
company PepsiCo provoked an outcry in the French political arena, some politicians swearing to protect
this French company from any foreign take-over. A few weeks later, the French government oﬃcially
proposed to shield ten ”strategic” industries, including biotechnologies, secure information systems, casinos
and the production of vaccines, from foreign acquisitions.
2do R&D and a higher share of R&D expenditures in sales than greenﬁeld aﬃliates, we
proceed to explore why this is the case. By running separate regressions for the two entry
modes, we discover that diﬀerences in R&D activities are partly explained by diﬀerences
in parent, aﬃliate, industry and country characteristics but also by diﬀerent reactions to
such characteristics. M&As seem to be motivated by asset-seeking motives to a larger
extent than greenﬁeld investments, especially in the 1990s. For instance, we ﬁnd that
intellectual property rights protection (IPR) only increases the propensity to do R&D for
the acquired aﬃliates. The same pattern holds for host-country R&D specialization —
measured either in terms of industry-level R&D or patenting.
More generally, the statistical analysis suggests that cross-border acquisitions and
greenﬁeld entry follow diﬀerent statistical models and should therefore be treated as dis-
tinct entry modes. This is in line with a new growing theoretical literature on international
M&As which, in contrast to the traditional trade literature, emphasizes that FDI through
greenﬁeld investments and through cross-border acquisitions are not ”perfect substitutes”
as entry modes [e.g. Blonigen (1997), Mattoo, Olerreaga and Saggi (2004), Nocke and
Yeaple (2006a,b) and Norbäck and Persson (2006)]. The new theory shows that system-
atic diﬀerences in aﬃliate performance can emerge between entry modes due to synergies
and market power eﬀects from acquisitions. By ﬁnding signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the R&D
activities of acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates with otherwise similar characteristics, we
provide some evidence for this hypothesis.
It should be noted that our results are derived from a unique database that provides two
major advantages. First, it enables us to identify the two main entry modes and compare
their impact on aﬃl i a t eR & Do v e ral o n gp e r i o do ft i m e( from 1970 to 1998). Statistical
oﬃces in most countries (with the main exceptions of USA, Japan and Argentina) do
usually not record the FDI entry mode. Second, detailed information about parent and
aﬃliate ﬁrm characteristics makes it possible to analyze the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and
t a k et h ew o r l d - w i d ei n n o v a t i o ns t r a t e g i e so fM N E si n t oa c c o u n t .
The previous empirical literature has so far mainly focused on determinants of entry
mode3 and very few papers have directly examined the performance of aﬃliates given the
3In recent papers, Iranzo (2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2006a,b) and Raﬀ, Ryan and Stähler (2005)
3entry mode.4 There are virtually no empirical papers comparing M&As and greenﬁeld
investments with respect to R&D.5 Earlier empirical studies on the relationship between
aﬃliate R&D and entry mode have treated R&D capabilities as one of the main determi-
nants of the choice between acquisitions, joint ventures and wholly owned greenﬁeld entry
[e.g. Hennart, 1991, Hennart and Park, 1993, Gomes Cassares, 1989].6 In this context,
we contribute to the previous literature by providing new empirical evidence on the im-
pact of entry mode on aﬃliate R&D. We do not only examine how entry mode and ﬁrm
characteristics aﬀect a ﬁrm’s choice of doing aﬃliate R&D, but we also examine if these
characteristics have diﬀerential eﬀects on the level of aﬃliate R&D given the entry mode.
The link between entry mode and aﬃliate R&D also deserves a deeper analysis consid-
ering the large increase in the overseas R&D of multinational ﬁrms; between 1991 and 2001
aﬃliate R&D expenditures increased by more than 50 percent in the OECD area (OECD,
2005). This increasing internationalization of R&D activities might reﬂect a change in
ﬁrms’ overseas R&D strategies. The role of aﬃliate R&D activities has shifted from pri-
marily supporting the local production units and adjusting products to the local market
to knowledge creation. As a result, an increasing number of overseas R&D laboratories
source local technological knowledge and develop new technologies to be part of ﬁrms’
ﬁnd that ﬁrm characteristics aﬀect the entry mode choice, conﬁrming that cross-border acquisition and
greenﬁeld entry are not substitutes, but rather chosen for speciﬁcr e a s o n s .
4See the business literature, e.g. Shaver (1998) who analyzes the exit behavior of acquired and greenﬁeld
aﬃliates; Woodcock et al. (1994) and Slangen and Hennart (2005) who compare the overall performance
of aﬃliates.
5An exception is Belderbos (2003) who in a cross-section of manufacturing aﬃliates of Japanese ﬁrms
ﬁnds that the R&D intensity of acquired aﬃliates substantially exceeds that of wholly owned greenﬁeld
aﬃliates, while the R&D intensity of minority owned ventures is higher if the Japanese parent ﬁrms lack
strong R&D capabilities at home. The eﬀects of cross-border M&As on the R&D activities of a host
country are, to the best of our knowledge, only examined in the study by Bertrand and Zuniga (2005).
6For instance, Hennart and Park (1993) ﬁnd that Japanese ﬁrms prefer greenﬁeld investment as an
entry mode in the U.S. market when they possess strong sources of competitive advantage and opt for
M&As when they possess weak sources of competitive advantage. These ﬁndings suggest that technology
sourcing could represent an important determinant of cross-border M&As as an entry mode, consistent
with the logic of asset-seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993). This is also a building block in the new theoretical
literature on cross-border acquisitions.
4core knowledge capital. Since R&D investments are a source of strategic technologies and
competitiveness and, more generally, a major determinant of economic growth, it is par-
ticularly relevant for a host country to explore whether the entry mode has an impact on
aﬃliate R&D and, if it does, how.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature. Section
3 provides a preliminary analysis of the data. Section 4 reports the econometric model
and the variables used in the regressions. Section 5 discusses the empirical ﬁndings and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In the theoretical literature of FDI, there is usually no distinction between the entry modes
of FDI. A small but growing theoretical literature has therefore started to examine the
driving forces behind MNEs’ choice of entry mode and how this aﬀects the welfare of host
countries.7 A central idea in this new theoretical literature is that FDI through greenﬁeld
investments and through cross-border acquisitions, respectively, are distinct entry modes,
and that systematic diﬀerences in aﬃliate performance may therefore emerge.
For instance, Mattoo et al. (2004) show how restrictions on cross-border acquisitions
may be warranted in order to increase technology transfers. They ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h em a r k e t
power coming from monopolizing foreign acquisitions may increase foreign technology
transfers. However, forcing the MNE to enter through greenﬁeld investment may also give
rise to strategic motives for transferring technology. Policy interventions may then increase
the welfare of the host country if the preference of the host government with regard to the
optimal entry mode diﬀe r sf r o mt h eM N E ’ sc h o i c e .
Integrating recent models of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the international trade literature
with ideas from the vast strategic management literature, Nocke and Yeaple (2006a, 2006b)
show that cross-border M&As may arise so as to exploit complementaries when combining
7See, for instance, Blonigen (1997), Bjorvatn (2004), Bertrand and Zitouna (2005), Head and Ries
(2006), Jovanovic and Rosseau (2002), Mattoo et al. (2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2006a, 2006b), Norbäck
and Persson (2006), Iranzo (2004) and Raﬀ, Ryan and Stähler (2005).
5the ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets of the target and the acquiring ﬁrm. Greenﬁe l de n t r y ,o nt h eo t h e r
hand, is seen as a way of more directly exploiting the MNEs’ own ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets.
Given the speciﬁc assumptions on the nature of MNEs’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and targets’
assets, they show that MNEs engaging in acquisitions may be more or less eﬃcient than
MNEs undertaking greenﬁeld investments.
Norbäck and Persson (2006) show that the welfare eﬀects of an acquisition crucially
depend on the level of complementaries generated. If an acquisition is mainly driven
by market power motives, consumers are worse oﬀ. At a high level of complementaries,
however, consumers gain from lower product market prices as the acquiring MNE invests
aggressively to preempt its rivals in the product market. In addition, the domestic sellers
are able to capture a large share of the surplus generated by the acquisition through the
bidding competition among MNEs over the domestic assets. Their model also illustrates
h o wR & Di n v e s t m e n t si na na c q u i r e da ﬃliate can diﬀer drastically depending on the
motive of the acquisition. R&D investments by the acquiring MNE may be small if
market power — rather than eﬃciency gains — is the dominating motive for the acquisition.
On the other hand, if there are large complementaries, the acquiring MNE may have
large incentives to invest in R&D in order to preempt rival MNEs in the product market.
R&D investments induced by an acquisition may then not only exceed the investments
conducted by the target, had no acquisition occurred, but may also exceed the investments
by the acquiring MNE, had this ﬁrm been forced to enter by a greenﬁeld investment.
Large complementaries may not always increase MNEs’ investments, however. As
noted by Nocke and Yeaple (2006a), acquired ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets could be transferred
across borders. This link between ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and FDI through acquisitions is also
emphasized by Blonigen (1997). Using Japanese acquisitions in the US, he shows that
currency depreciations make FDI through acquisitions more likely in industries with more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. In addition, the eﬀect is not found for Japanese greenﬁeld FDI, where
the acquisition of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets is not involved.
For a host country government attempting to increase FDI and MNEs’ R&D invest-
ments, the new theory implies that selecting an optimal entry mode is likely to be very
involved. This suggests that empirical analysis could be used to examine how the entry
6mode aﬀects aﬃliate performance which, in turn, may give some guidance for appropriate
host country policies.
3E n t r y m o d e a n d a ﬃliate R&D
As a primary data source, we use a data set from the Research Institute of Industrial
Economics, based on a questionnaire sent to all Swedish MNEs every fourth year, on
average, since 1970. Data on R&D expenditures for aﬃliates is available from ﬁve surveys:
1970, 1978, 1990, 1994 and 1998. These surveys cover almost all Swedish multinational
ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector and their majority-owned aﬃliates abroad.
In the next sections, we ﬁrst examine the pattern of entry over time, industries and
regions. Then, we examine R&D activities in the aﬃliates, comparing acquired aﬃliates
with aﬃliates started through greenﬁeld entry.
3.1 The evolution of entry mode
Figure 1(i) shows the number of aﬃliates established by greenﬁeld entry or mergers and
acquisitions, respectively. As seen, aﬃliates established through greenﬁeld entry were more
common in the 1970’s, whereas this was reversed in the 1990’s. This is consistent with the
international trend towards an increasing importance of cross-border M&As.
In Figure 1(ii), we examine if there are diﬀerent patterns across industries, using ﬁve
broader categories according to a taxonomy from OECD (1987, 1992): resource inten-
sive, labor intensive, scale intensive industries, industries with diﬀerentiated goods and
industries with science based goods. We can note that acquisitions have become more
common as an entry mode in all sectors over time. Acquisitions are most dominant in
resource-based industries and least common in science-based industries for most of the pe-
riod. Resource-based industries may have high entry barriers, thereby making greenﬁeld
entry diﬃcult. In science-based industries, on the other hand, greenﬁeld may be preferred
to prevent a leakage of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge assets to rival ﬁrms. However, it could be
pointed out that there is a sharp decrease in the share of acquisitions in resource-based
7industries and a parallel dramatic increase in science-based industries at the end of the
period.8
We also examine if there is a regional pattern of cross-border acquisitions. In Figure
1(iii), we observe that a higher frequency of acquisitions is associated with the regional
development level. This is evident since the share of acquisitions is higher in Europe
and North America than in South America, developing countries in Asia and Africa and
developed countries in Asia and Paciﬁc. This may reﬂect a better supply of targets,
particularly targets with complementary assets, in developed countries.
3.2 The evolution of aﬃliate R&D
Let us now brieﬂy investigate if there are systematic diﬀerences in R&D activities between
aﬃliates started through greenﬁeld investments and aﬃliates joining MNEs through ac-
quisitions of local ﬁrms. In Figure 2 (i), we ﬁrst show the average aﬃliate R&D intensity,
deﬁned as R&D expenditures to total sales. Several interesting features arise: in contrast
to what might be expected, acquired aﬃliates on average have a higher R&D intensity
than greenﬁeld aﬃliates. However, this R&D gap is decreasing over time: at the begin-
ning of the period, the R&D intensity in acquired ﬁrms is almost twice the corresponding
intensity in greenﬁeld aﬃliates.
In Figure 2(ii), we show the average probability of doing R&D for each year. Note
that while R&D is not conducted at all in about half of the aﬃliates in our sample, the
probability of doing R&D is increasing over time — regardless of entry mode. It is more
likely that an acquired aﬃliate performs R&D than a greenﬁe l dv e n t u r e .T h eg a pi nt h e
likelihood of doing R&D seems to have increased at the very end of the period. Thus, yet
again we do not ﬁn dt h a tR & Di na c q u i r e da ﬃliates is dominated by R&D in greenﬁeld
ventures.
8We may also note that the number of aﬃliates has a decreasing trend in the 1990s. This might be
explained by a number of large Swedish MNEs were acquired by or merged with foreign ﬁrms during the
1990s. For instance, in 1988 Asea AB merged with Brown Boveri Ltd and therefore ASEA is no longer
in the data base after 1990. Still, in terms of employees and sales, FDI from Swedish MNEs increased in
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Figure 1: Mode of entry over time, industries and regions.
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Figure 3: Aﬃliate R&D activities by entry mode and age.
11We then turn to compare R&D expenditure in the aﬃliates with non-zero expenditure
(Figure 2(iii)). Once more, there are several features worth noting. First, there is a much
less clear pattern in the overall R&D intensity, which appears to ﬂuctuate between surveys.
The R&D gap between acquisition and greenﬁeld aﬃliates seems to decrease over time,
and even becomes negative in the end period.
One immediate explanation to the R&D gap between the two types of aﬃliates might
be the age proﬁle of the aﬃliates. Acquired aﬃliates may have R&D capabilities that they
have taken over from previous owners, whereas greenﬁeld ventures need time to build up
R&D capabilities. It could then be argued that the R&D gap should decrease over the age
of the aﬃliates. In Figure 3(i), we therefore plot the average R&D intensity as a function
of aﬃliate age.9 Once again, we ﬁnd a persistent R&D gap in favor of acquired aﬃliates.
This is even more accentuated when looking at the average probability of doing R&D in
Figure 3(ii). When ﬁnally looking at the average R&D intensity for aﬃliates with positive
R&D expenditure in Figure 3(iii), we do not ﬁnd any clear pattern.10
Figures 1, 2 and 3 only illustrate the raw diﬀerences in aﬃliate R&D. These diﬀerences
could, however, be due to diﬀerences in other characteristics of the aﬃliates and their




To measure R&D activity in the aﬃliates, we will use the R&D intensity of an aﬃliate i





9Age is deﬁned as the number of years an aﬃliate has been part of the MNE.
10Again, there appears to be a decreasing trend in the 1990s. This might be partly due to a changing
decomposition of the sample. Another explanation is that sales increased more than R&D expenditures,
particularly in the 1990s.
12where R&Dit is total outlays for R&D in aﬃliate i at time t and Salesit is the aﬃliate’s
corresponding total sales. Thus, we normalize R&D expenditures with total sales to control
for size eﬀects and express the intensity in percentage points. Using the intensity, we also
control for omitted variables that have a similar eﬀect on the aﬃliate’s choice of R&D
expenditures and sales.11
A sn o t e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,am a j o r i t yo fa ﬃliates report zero R&D and hence,
the dependent variable RDit contains a large number of zeros. We will take logs on the
dependent variable RDit, which will lead to a loss of observations with zero R&D and may
result in OLS estimates on RDit to be both biased and inconsistent. Therefore, we apply
the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to analyze the eﬀect of entry mode on aﬃliate R&D
activity given by (2) and (3), below:




3Zjt + uijt (2)




3Xjt + λit + εijt, (3)
where DRDit =1if RDit > 0, RDit =0otherwise. Zi is a vector of the ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i -
ables and Zj is a vector of the country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sa ﬀecting the decision to perform
R&D. Xit and Xjt are the corresponding ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sa ﬀect-
ing the intensity of doing R&D, uij and εijt are the usual error terms, and λijt =
φ(α0Z)
Φ(α0Z) is
the error correction variable, where φ(.) and Φ(.) are respectively the normal density and
cumulative distributions.12 The explanatory variables are presented in the section below.
11Thus, to avoid endogeneity problems, we will not include aﬃliate size in the OLS regressions as one of
the explanatory variables. Some other studies have included it on both sides of the equation: it results in
mixed evidence of the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on aﬃliate R&D intensity. For instance, Kumar (2001) and Zejan
(1990) found a weakly positive eﬀect of aﬃliate size on R&D intensity, while Belderbos (2003) did not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect. In our study, this variable is only introduced at the ﬁrst stage of the Heckman
procedure.
12Another alternative would be to use a Tobit approach. However, zero R&D expenditure is likely to
be a consequence of binary decision-making rather than censoring, as assumed in a Tobit model. If ﬁrms
ﬁrst decide whether to establish a new research center, and then the exact amount of R&D expenditure,
the Heckman two-stage estimation is more justiﬁed. This two-stage decision process might come from the
existence of ﬁxed sunk costs when deciding to set up a new research center abroad. Once this ﬁxed sunk
13Note that MA_GIi is the variable of interest indicating whether an aﬃliate was acquired
(MA_GIi =1 ) or created from a greenﬁeld investment (MA_GIi =0 ).
Estimating (2) and (3) with the dummy variable MA_GIi will give us information on
whether the propensity of doing R&D and the intensity of R&D activities, on average,
diﬀer between aﬃliates incorporated through acquisitions and aﬃliates started by green-
ﬁeld investments. This investigates whether the "R&D-gap" manifested in Figures 2 and
3 is robust when controlling for other characteristics that may potentially explain this
diﬀerence.
Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) assume that R&D in the two types of aﬃliates only diﬀers by
a ﬁxed amount (by an intercept diﬀerence) and that the impact of explanatory variables
on aﬃliate R&D is constrained to be the same. To obtain more information, we then relax

































where e is an indicator for entry mode. We then test whether the R&D activities in
acquired aﬃliates and aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld investments follow diﬀerent statistical
relationships. The analysis serves as a test of the new theory on international acquisitions
discussed in Section 2.
Finally, we consider the situation where the entry mode and the R&D decisions may
be dependent on each other. If the entry choice is not a random process, but determined
by unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that also inﬂuence the R&D decision [Shaver (1998),
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003)] this will have an impact on our estimates. From the
theory in Section 2, we know that cross-border acquisitions may emerge due to eﬃciency
cost has been spent, ﬁrms decide on the level of R&D expenditures. Some unobserved characteristics
aﬀecting the selection process, i.e. the decision to do zero R&D or positive R&D, could also inﬂuence the
outcome. In that case, observations in the sample will diﬀer systematically from those that are not in
the sample, thereby leading to a selection bias. For comparison, we also estimated Tobit regressions. The
results were qualitatively similar and are therefore not reported here.
14as well as market power motives. Thus, the entry mode is likely to be endogenous and self-
selected. Unfortunately, we do not have any direct measures of market power and potential
synergies in our data. As a partial control, we will apply a bivariate probit model in order
to control for the double selection process for the entry mode and R&D decisions [Tunali
(1986), Wetzels and Zorlu (2003)].13 The double selection model simultaneously controls
for both R&D and entry mode decisions that may be related.14
We ﬁrst add the following equation modelling the entry choice:




2Wjt + zijt, (6)
where MA_GIi =1if the aﬃliate i is incorporated through acquisition and MA_GIi =0
if the aﬃliate i is created through greenﬁeld entry. Wit and Wjt are the corresponding
ﬁrm- and country-level control variables and zijt is the error term.
We then estimate a bivariate probit model on equations (6) and (2), with the entry





it. These error correction terms are then included when estimating





























it controls for the propensity to perform R&D in acquired aﬃliates
and the propensity to enter through acquisition, respectively. When estimating (7) for
aﬃliates started from greenﬁeld entry (e = GI), the included error correction terms λ
GI,RD
it
13Another way of tackling the simultaneity of these decisions is to estimate a multinominal discrete
model. However, this econometric method is perfectly valid only if the assumption of independence of
irrelevant alternatives is respected: error terms are supposed to be independent between all choices. It
implies that the ratio of probabilities of any two alternatives is unaﬀected by the choice set, which seems
to be unlikely in our situation.
14The error structure of the model depends on whether the decisions on R&D vs no R&D and M&A vs
greenﬁeld investment are made jointly or not. This issue is related to the interdependency of these two
choices, and not their timing. There is a sequential decision process when one decision is only deﬁned
given a particular choice of the other decision (Maddala 1986), which is not the case in our paper.
15and λ
GI
it controls for the propensity to perform R&D in aﬃliates entered through greenﬁeld
investment and the propensity to enter greenﬁeld, respectively. To compute these lambda
terms, we follow the procedure in Viitanen (2004).15
4.2 Explanatory variables
We include a set of variables at the aﬃliate, parent and country level to control for other
determinants of aﬃliate R&D. Most variables are expressed in log form and all variables
with monetary value are converted into US dollars in constant value of 1995 (for details,
see tables A2 and A3 in the appendix for variable description and summary statistics).
At the aﬃliate level, we include the age of an aﬃliate, deﬁned as the number of years
the aﬃliate has been part of the MNE (Age). This captures the eﬀect of time on aﬃliate
R&D. There could be a threshold level of development which is required for a parent ﬁrm
to invest in aﬃliate R&D, or a parent ﬁrm could also decide to reduce the R&D of acquired
aﬃliates over time.
We also include the export intensity of the aﬃliate (Export). Previous research has
found a positive eﬀect of the export intensity of aﬃliates on the scale of R&D activities
[Hewitt (1980), Zejan (1990) and Belderbos (2003)]. High export intensity may imply
that the aﬃliate is used as a hub for regional or world markets in the product area, rather
than just serving the local market. Such hub aﬃliates are more likely to function as R&D
centers adapting technologies and creating new knowledge [Håkansson and Nobel (1993)
and Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998)].
We examine the impact of several parent ﬁrm characteristics. In general, the rela-
tionship between the R&D intensity of the parent ﬁrm (RD parent) and overseas R&D is
not straightforward. On the one hand, a parent ﬁrm in a high technology sector might
require a high level of R&D expenditures abroad to adapt high-technology products to
the local market and transfer technological knowledge. It may also be costly to protect
propriety technologies from being dissipated. If such measures require large resources,
the ﬁrm may concentrate R&D to the home country (Norbäck, 2001). But foreign R&D
15Tarja Viitanen graciously provided a STATA program in order to estimate the double-selection model.
16activities may also entail localized absorption capacity for eﬃcient technology sourcing in
the host countries [Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Kamien and Zang (2000)].
T h er o l eo fo v e r s e a sR & Da c t i v i t i e sm a yb eaf u n c t i o no fc o r p o r a t ee x p e r i e n c ea n d
growth. As the foreign operations become more important, the role of overseas R&D
may change from supportive to creative, leading to an increase in the aﬃliate R&D. The
proportion of overseas sales is found to have a positive eﬀect on the proportion of overseas
R&D by e.g. Lall (1979), Mansﬁeld et al. (1979), and Hirschey and Caves (1981) for US
ﬁrms and by Belderbos (1995) and Odagiri and Yasada (1996) for Japanese ﬁrms. We
consider a direct measure of the internationalization of the R&D activities, deﬁned as the
share of foreign R&D in total R&D of the parent ﬁrm (RD abroad). A parent ﬁrm with a
larger share of total R&D abroad is expected to invest more in the R&D of the aﬃliate.
Another R&D experience variable (Experience), deﬁn e da st h en u m b e ro fy e a r ss i n c e
the ﬁrst overseas R&D investment of the parent ﬁrm, is used to capture the learning-by-
doing process. The experience of overseas R&D is believed to promote the eﬃciency of
R&D activities abroad and facilitate the coordination with the network of R&D centers.
T h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no fa ne ﬃcient decentralized management through communication and
control mechanisms requires speciﬁc capabilities which are developing over time (Kogut
and Zander, 1995). International experience in R&D should then have a positive impact
on the decision to invest in overseas R&D [Belderbos (2001), Håkanson and Nobel (1993a),
(1993b), Pearce (1989), Zejan (1990)].
Finally, we include the total size of the parent ﬁrm (Size parent)a n dt h el a b o rp r o d u c -
tivity of the parent company (Prod parent). A larger ﬁrm can more easily take advantage
of scale and scope economies within R&D projects. Furthermore, larger ﬁrms may have
greater market power and a better capacity to invest in and manage dispersed R&D sys-
tems. Larger ﬁrms may possess a greater capacity for appropriate returns to R&D because
of ﬁrst mover advantages, brand reputation or, for instance, distribution networks. More-
over, ﬁrm productivity has been found to be positively related to the likelihood of ﬁrms
engaging in FDI (Helpman et al. 2004) and ﬁrm R&D activities in particular. It could
therefore also be related to the foreign R&D activities. Firm productivity may not only
reﬂect technological know-how but also managerial know-how advantages.
17We also control for host country characteristics. A positive relation is expected between
aﬃliate R&D and income level (GDP cap)o rm a r k e ts i z e( GDP): R&D expenditures for
adapting processes and products to local conditions as well as performing creative R&D
are increasing with the income level of the consumers and the size of the market (Zejan,
1990). Adaptation investments are particularly relevant in large markets (UNCTAD,
2005). In a high-income country, the demand for high-quality products or/and for new
technologies is more important and more R&D is conducted. It is also likely that the
supply of assets with potential synergies arising from acquisitions is larger in countries
with a higher development and/or a higher market size, which would in particular be
important for R&D investments in acquired aﬃliates.16
We also take into account the impact of the distance between Sweden and the host
country (Distance). We expect a negative eﬀect on the R&D intensity of the aﬃliate.
The geographical distance may obstruct technology transfers by making communication
more diﬃcult. With a greater distance, the assimilation and application of new knowledge
becomes less easy as it hinders eﬃcient supervision and control of the R&D activity abroad.
In the selection equation of the Heckman estimations, i.e (2) and (4), we add an index
of property rights (IPR) from Ginarte and Park (1997). Multinational ﬁrms should be
more reluctant to set up an R&D center when the protection for intellectual property
rights is weak. Indeed, the IPR is expected to have a greater impact on the decision of
whether to locate an R&D center abroad than on the level of R&D, since it constitutes
one major determinant of anticipated total discounted future beneﬁts from R&D activities.
IPR may be less relevant for the R&D intensity, since improved property rights protection
may increase both R&D expenditures and aﬃliate sales. In the selection equations, we
also add aﬃliate size since a larger aﬃliate is expected be more likely to perform R&D.
16M&As could, in fact, be an unrealistic alternative for greenﬁeld investments if the supply of suitable
target ﬁrms is limited as in developing countries with underdeveloped asset markets. Besides, in many
developing countries, foreign acquisitions are restricted. On the other hand, in some situations greenﬁeld
investment is not an alternative to M&As. For instance, during ﬁnancial crises or large privatization
programs, the supply of target ﬁrms overshadows the role of greenﬁeld entry. We partly control for these
last two aspects by introducing year, regional and industries dummies.
18In the bivariate probit model, we need to include variables that have an impact on
the trade-oﬀ between M&A and greenﬁeld investment in (6), but not R&D spending, for
identiﬁcation in (4) and (5). We use two additional variables in the M&A equation (6):
Exchange rate and Past Number MAs. Exchange rate gives the units of local currency per
USD at time t related to the units of local currency per USD at t−5.Ah i g h e rv a l u eo ft h e
variable implies a currency depreciation in the last ﬁve years and hence a lower price for
acquisition objects. It is expected to increase FDI through M&As as shown by Blonigen
(1997). Past Number MAs, deﬁned as the number of Swedish M&As within an industry
in a country over the last three years, captures both the behavior of MNEs and the supply
of local targets. MNEs may ﬁrst acquire to imitate each other and then to minimize their
business risk (Schenk, 1996) or to obtain market power and/or prevent competitors from
having an advantage in a country. It should be noted that the variable GDP also proxies
the target supply: larger countries are more likely to have a higher M&A activity.
We use dummy variables for year, industry and region.17 Our industry dummy variables
are deﬁned as ﬁve broader categories according to a taxonomy in OECD (1987, 1992):
resource intensive, labor intensive, scale intensive, diﬀerentiated goods and science based
goods. We use regional dummy variables deﬁned as ﬁve main geographical areas, Europe,
North America, South America, Developing Countries in Asia and Africa and Developed
Countries in Asia and Paciﬁc.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Pooled regressions
Table 1 shows the results from estimating (2) and (3), i.e the pooled sample with the
entry mode dummy variable MA_GI. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results
for the ﬁrst and second stages of the Heckman two-stage procedure. In Figure 2 (ii) in
Section 3, we illustrated that an acquired aﬃliate is more likely to undertake R&D than
17We also use country and/or parent ﬁrm dummies. This does not qualitatively change our conclusions.
We do not report these results, but they are available upon request.
19a greenﬁeld aﬃliate without controlling for other characteristics and determinants. The
results for the ﬁrst-stage probit in column (1) show that acquired aﬃliates are more often
associated with R&D activities, independently of aﬃliate age, size and other characteris-
tics. Furthermore, the positive and signiﬁcant dummy variable in the second stage of the
Heckman estimation suggests that R&D activities by the acquired ﬁrms are larger than
those of greenﬁeld aﬃliates after taking into account unobserved characteristics aﬀecting
the selection process.18
The economic importance of the estimates is large. The marginal eﬀect of the entry
mode dummy MA_GI in equation (2) is 0.14. Thus, when comparing two aﬃliates with
otherwise similar characteristics, except for the entry mode, an acquired aﬃliate is 12
percent more likely to perform R&D as compared to an aﬃliate started from greenﬁeld
entry. The corresponding eﬀect of the entry mode dummy in equation (3) implies that
the R&D intensity is on average about 46 percent higher in acquired aﬃliates.19 These
estimated eﬀects are similar to the raw diﬀerences observed in Figures 2 (ii) and (iii).
I nT a b l e1 ,w ea n a l y z et h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fa ﬃliate age in more detail by estimating the
eﬀects for aﬃliates aged less than eight years and those aged between eight and twenty
years. The time horizon is important since there could be a threshold level of development
w h i c hi sr e q u i r e df o rap a r e n tﬁrm to invest in the aﬃliate R&D. If a greenﬁeld aﬃliate
starting from scratch requires a longer time to invest in R&D activities or if an acquiring
ﬁrm reduces (or closes down) the R&D activities of the target some time after the acqui-
sition, we would expect the eﬀect of the entry mode dummy be diﬀerent when we split
t h es a m p l ea c c o r d i n gt oa ﬃliate age.
Columns (3) to (6) in Table 1 show the results for Heckman estimations. It appears
that in both sub-samples, acquired aﬃliates are more likely to do R&D and have a higher
level of R&D than greenﬁeld ones which is consistent with Figure 2 in Section 3. The
18This result is consistent with Belderbos (2003). In his paper, acquired aﬃliates of Japanese MNEs are
shown to have a higher R&D intensity than aﬃliates created as greenﬁeld investments in Tobit estimations.
The Tobit method gives qualitative the same results for our sample.
19T h ee s t i m a t eo fβ1 in equation (3) is ˆ β1 =0 .376. From (3), it follows that
d RDMA− d RDGI
d RDGI = e
ˆ β1 − 1=
0.4564.
20coeﬃcient diﬀerences indicate that the likelihood of having R&D is larger for the younger
acquired aﬃl i a t e st h a nf o rt h eo l d e ro n e s ,b u tt h el e v e lo fR & Di sh i g h e ra m o n gt h eo l d e r
acquired aﬃliates. If there is some start-up delay in the R&D activities of greenﬁeld
aﬃliates, it does not seem as if the greenﬁeld aﬃliates catch up with the acquired ones
over time and the acquired aﬃliates do not seem to reduce R&D over time.
The theory reviewed in section 2 suggests that the impact of cross-border acquisitions
may diﬀer between industries, since market power eﬀects and complementarities may not
be uniform between diﬀerent industries. Therefore, we checked the results on a number
of subsamples. As the results do not qualitatively diﬀer from the previous ones, we only
state them here and provide a brief discussion.20
First, we deﬁned sub-samples based the OECD deﬁnition of industries illustrated in
Figure 1 (ii). In Labour-intensive and Science-based industries, we ﬁnd that acquired
aﬃliates have both a signiﬁcantly higher probability of doing R&D and — given that
R&D is performed — also have a signiﬁcantly higher intensity of R&D. In scale-intensive
and natural resource intensive industries, the intensity of R&D is signiﬁcantly higher in
acquired aﬃliates, whereas we ﬁnd that the MA_GI dummy is positive, but not signiﬁcant,
in the probability regression (2). In the sample with diﬀerentiated product industries, we
ﬁnd that the MA_GI dummy is positive, but not signiﬁcant, in both the probability and
the intensity equations (2) and (3). Not in any sample do we ﬁnd less of R&D in acquired
aﬃliates in terms of a negative point estimate on the MA_GI dummy, irrespective of how
R&D is measured.
We also tried to isolate investments where we expect market power reasons to be more
prevalent. Potentially, there may be smaller diﬀerences in R&D activities between entry
modes in horizontal or market-seeking FDI, since an acquisition is likely to have a larger
eﬀect on market power in the local market which, in turn, may generate acquisitions with
smaller synergies.21 To explore this, we split the sample according to export intensity.
20T h er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
21As noted in Section 2, the model by Norbäck and Persson (2006) shows that R&D investments by the
acquiring MNE may be limited if market power — rather than eﬃciency gains — is the dominating motive
for the acquisition.
21Irrespective of whether aﬃliates were mainly selling to the local market or to external
markets, acquired aﬃliates had a signiﬁcantly higher probability of doing R&D, as well as
as i g n i ﬁcantly higher intensity in doing R&D. We also deﬁned an additional sub-sample
where the parent ﬁrm was required to be in the same industry (four-digit) as the aﬃliate
which, on basis of the IO literature, can be argued to be closer to horizontal investments.
Again, also in this narrowly deﬁned group, acquired aﬃliates had a higher probability of
doing R&D as well as a higher intensity of R&D.
5.2 Separate regressions
So far, we ﬁnd that M&As as an entry mode, on average, imply more frequent and intensive
aﬃliate R&D than greenﬁeld entry, and that this diﬀerence persists over time. The pooled
estimation approach, however, is less informative in explaining why this is the case, since
this average diﬀerence is captured by the ”black box” dummy variable MA_GI. To examine
t h es o u r c eo fd i ﬀerences in R&D behavior between entry modes in more detail, we now
turn to estimating equations (4) and (5) where the impact of the various control variables
is allowed to diﬀer between entry modes.
We should ﬁrst stress that the two types of aﬃliates diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of
most variables as shown by Table A3 in the appendix. Acquired aﬃliates are, on average,
smaller (Size Aﬃliate) but more export intensive (Export) and have larger (Size parent)
and more productive parents (Prod parent) with a larger share of overseas R&D (RD
Abroad). They are located in countries closer to Sweden (Distance). These countries have
a higher income level (GDP cap) and a better intellectual property right protection (IPR).
Greenﬁeld aﬃliates, on the other hand, have been part of the parent ﬁrm for a longer period
of time (Age) and have more R&D intensive parents (RD parent) with a longer experience
of overseas R&D (Experience). These simple tests of means reveal diﬀerences that may
come through as coeﬃcient diﬀerences in the regressions.
In Table 2, we show the results for separate Heckman estimations and the tests for
coeﬃcient diﬀerences.22 The Wald- and F-tests rejects both stages of the Heckman speci-
22Coeﬃcient diﬀerences are tested by interacting all explanatory variables with the entry mode dummy
22ﬁcation with pooled entry modes. This suggests that aﬃliate, parent and country charac-
teristics impact aﬃliate R&D in diﬀerent ways depending on the entry mode.23 Thus, the
R&D activities in acquired aﬃliates and aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld investments, follow
diﬀerent statistical relationships which, in turn, shows that cross-border acquisitions and
greenﬁeld entry are not ”perfect substitutes”, as emphasized by the new literature on the
e n t r ym o d eo fF D I .T h e ya r el i k e l yt ob ed r i v e nb yd i ﬀerent strategic motivations.
In addition, we ﬁnd that neither the likelihood of doing R&D nor the intensity of
R&D activities of acquired aﬃliates vary with time after the acquisition, as measured
by the Age v a r i a b l e .W en o t et h a ta ﬃliate age has a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of
doing R&D in greenﬁeld aﬃliates which is somewhat puzzling given that building up R&D
capacity is expected to take time and thus, older aﬃliates could be more likely do R&D
(UNCTAD, 2000). However, the results might mean that R&D in greenﬁeld investments
is more related to adapting to the parent ﬁrm’s technology. Once more, the diﬀerences
in the R&D level between greenﬁeld and acquired aﬃliates do not necessarily vanish with
increasing aﬃliate age. There is no support for the assumption that R&D in acquired
aﬃliates tends to decline over time, while greenﬁeld aﬃliates are more prompt to develop
R&D activities.
T h ee x p o r ti n t e n s i t yo ft h ea ﬃliate (Export)h a sas i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
likelihood of doing R&D in acquired aﬃliates and on the level of R&D in both types of
aﬃliates, which supports the hypothesis that R&D is concentrated to aﬃliates serving as
hubs with several functions. There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬀect of some
parent characteristics. A higher R&D intensity of the parent (RD parent) implies that
R&D is more likely in both types of aﬃliates, but that the eﬀect is larger for acquired
aﬃliates. A longer experience of previous foreign R&D (Experience) has a positive impact
on the likelihood and the level of R&D in greenﬁeld aﬃliates, while it has no impact on the
likelihood of R&D and a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of R&D in acquired
variable.
23We also checked whether the estimated coeﬃcients for all variables which are not binary in (4) and
(5) where jointly signiﬁcant. Again by applying separate Wald- and F-tests for each stage, this showed
that the slope coeﬃcients, in both stages, diﬀer signﬁcantly between entry modes.
23aﬃliates. The latter results provide some evidence that MNEs with less international
R&D experience actively use acquisitions to strengthen their own ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets with
acquired ones.
The productivity of parents (Prod parent) has a positive impact on the propensity of
ag r e e n ﬁeld aﬃliate to do R&D and the level of R&D, but no signiﬁcant impact on the
R&D of acquired aﬃliates. The result is interesting to put in the context of Nocke’s and
Yeaple’s (2005b) model which predicts that more eﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to engage
in greenﬁeld FDI, since building a plant is worthwhile only if the gains are suﬃciently
large.
Parent size (Size) does not seem to capture the same aspects of parent characteristics
as parent productivity (Prod parent) since it has a negative impact on the level of R&D
and the likelihood that an aﬃliate has R&D for both types of aﬃliates, while this negative
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly weaker for acquired aﬃliates.
It is interesting to note that intellectual property rights protection (IPR)h a sap o s i -
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀect only on the acquired aﬃliates. A plausible explanation is that
acquisitions are motivated by technology sourcing and assets synergies and therefore, they
are more sensitive to intellectual property rights protection. On the contrary, greenﬁeld
investments could involve transfers of less speciﬁc and more common technological knowl-
edge from the parent to the aﬃliate. Once more, this might be the case if the objective
of aﬃliate R&D is rather to adapt the home product to local market conditions than to
source technology and stimulate knowledge creation.
We can also note the asymmetry in the eﬀects of per capita income. A higher develop-
ment level as measured by income per capita is positively related to the R&D intensity in
acquired aﬃliates, while it is negatively related to the R&D intensity in greenﬁeld aﬃli-
ates. This may indeed reﬂect that acquisitions occur to generate synergies, whereas R&D
in greenﬁeld aﬃliates may be more inclined towards adaptive R&D. Developed countries
are more likely to have targets with sources of synergies.
245.3 Comparing the 1970’s to the 1990’s
As illustrated in Figure 1, both the number of cross-border acquisitions and foreign R&D
activities of multinational ﬁrms have increased since the 1970’s. We explore whether
important changes in the eﬀects of entry mode on aﬃliate R&D have taken place by
splitting the full sample into the 1970’s and 1990’s samples. It should be pointed out that
in some cases, the sub-samples become small, which could inﬂuence the signiﬁcance of the
results.
Tables 3 and 4 show that the entry mode dummy in pooled estimates from (2) and
(3) are again signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that acquired aﬃliates are more likely
to do R&D and have a higher level of R&D during both sub-periods (column 1 in both
tables). The Wald and F-tests of coeﬃcient diﬀerences (columns 4 and 8 in both tables)
reject the pooled speciﬁcations, however, conﬁrming that acquired aﬃliates and aﬃliates
established by greenﬁeld entry are fundamentally diﬀerent. It should be noted that the F
test is only weakly signiﬁcant at the second stage OLS in the 1970’s.
The R&D intensity of the parent ﬁrm (RD Parent)h a sap o s i t i v ei m p a c to nt h e
likelihood of R&D for both types of aﬃliates in the 1990’s, but the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant
for the acquired aﬃliates in the 1970’s. In the 1970’s, less productive parent ﬁrms (Prod
parent) are less likely to have R&D activities in the acquired aﬃliates. This variable has no
eﬀect on greenﬁeld aﬃliates. In the 1990’s, it only has an impact on the likelihood of R&D
in acquired aﬃliates. Comparing the results in the 1970s’ and 1990’s for the respective
entry modes provides an additional insight into the intellectual property right protection
(IPR). IPR has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of R&D only in the acquired aﬃliates in
the 1990’s. It is possible that cross-border acquisitions motivated by technology sourcing
have become more common in the latter sub-period and thereby, the importance of IPR
has increased.
I nt h e1 9 9 0 ’ s ,t h ee x p e r i e n c eo ft h ep a r e n tﬁrm from previous R&D has a negative
impact on the level of R&D in the acquired aﬃliates, but no signiﬁcant impact on greenﬁeld
aﬃl i a t e s . S i n c ew ed on o tﬁnd this diﬀerence in the 1970’s sample, it seems that it has
become more important for less experienced parents to catch-up by acquisitions. We
25s h o u l dp o i n to u tt h a tt h e r es e e mt ob ei n d u s t r y - s p e c i ﬁcd i ﬀerences during the 1990’s.
At the second stage, R&D intensity in acquired aﬃliates is higher in all industries, with
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in all industries except science-based industries.
The results for the 1990’s suggest that technology sourcing has become a more im-
portant motive for entry through acquisitions. To further scrutinize this, we add another
variable capturing a country’s industry-level specialization in R&D activities. We deﬁne












where t i st h et i m ei n d e x ,j is the country index, h is the industry index and where the
specialization is matched to aﬃliates based on the industry codes. This measure reveals
R&D specialization if country i’s share of ”world” R&D in a certain industry j is greater
than the country’s share of ”world” R&D in all industries.24
Table 5 shows the results for Heckman estimations with an RCA variable. In both
stages, the RCA variable is signiﬁcant and positive for acquired aﬃliates, but insigniﬁcant
for greenﬁeld aﬃliates. The result provides further support for the hypothesis that tech-
nology sourcing has become a more important motive for acquisitions in the 1990s, but
not for greenﬁeld entry. The results for the other variables are to a large extent as in Table
4.25 The inclusion of RCA reduces the signiﬁcance of the GDP cap variable, indicating
that a country’s income level partly captures the same eﬀect as RCA.
Finally, we may investigate if we can derive some additional information on the source of
the "R&D-gap" displayed in Figure 2 from the separate regressions. We noted statistically
signiﬁcant mean diﬀerences in characteristics for the acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates in
T a b l eA 3 .T h es i g n i ﬁcant Wald and F-tests in tables 2-5 also revealed that aﬃliate, parent,
24Due to data limitations, the measure can only be computed for the 1990’s sample. We deﬁne the
specialization measure in terms of patents but since the results do not diﬀer qualitatively, we only report
the results for R&D expenditures.
25Some diﬀerences may occur partly because including RCA reduces the sample to about 63 percent of
the total sample size for the 1990’s.
26industry and country characteristics impact aﬃliate R&D in diﬀerent ways depending
on the entry mode. This suggests that the observed diﬀerences in R&D performance
between acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates could be explained by (i) diﬀerences in parent,
aﬃliate, industry and country characteristics, but also by (ii) diﬀerent reactions to these
characteristics. As we pointed out previously, this latter aspect is emphasized by the
emerging literature on cross-border acquisitions.
To quantify these eﬀects, we use a simple Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, which is
derived in Appendix B and shown in detail i nt h et a b l eB 1 . T h i se x e r c i s es h o w st h a t
the diﬀerent reactions of acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates to given characteristics explains
about 50 percent of the diﬀerence in probability of doing R&D, and that this eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant. When separating the 1970s and the 1990s, the fact that acquired
aﬃliates and greenﬁeld aﬃliates follow diﬀerent statistical models explains 92 percent of
the "gap" in the propensity to perform R&D in the latter period. When applying the
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the R&D-intensity in equation (5), this provided less
precise estimates, but a similar pattern.
5.4 Double selection
We have so far assumed that the entry mode is exogenous. Since the entry mode and
the R&D decisions may be dependent on each other, we use a biprobit estimation as pre-
viously described in Section 4.26 The biprobit estimation also provides us with valuable
information about the determinants of the entry mode choice. However, there are limita-
tions to this analysis. Since the trade-oﬀ between these two diﬀerent entry modes is only
performed at the birth date, we are obliged to reduce our sample to include new aﬃliates
only. We therefore include aﬃliates which are at the maximum ﬁve years old in the main
estimation.27 Yet another problem is that the biprobit assumes a pooled estimation for
26It should be underlined that considering observable diﬀerences between acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃli-
ates as we do in previous separate estimations is also a way of reducing the potential bias (Hamilton and
Nickerson, 2003).
27We also checked the robustness of the results by varying the age limit. This exercise did not qualita-
tively change our results.
27the R&D decision, which was rejected in the previous analysis.
The results for the biprobit estimation are displayed in Table 6. The results for entry
mode choice in column (1) are worth discussing separately. For instance, the negative eﬀect
of parent productivity Prod parent conﬁrms the earlier interpretation that acquisitions
are asset-seeking by MNEs with weaker sources of competitive advantage. The positive
impact of Size Parent suggests that larger ﬁrms, on the other hand, are more likely to make
acquisitions. A reason could be that a larger ﬁrm is more likely to have complementary
assets or more ﬁnancial resources to expand through cross-border acquisitions. Among the
additional variables only aﬀecting the entry mode choice (see Section 4.2 for deﬁnitions),
Exchange rate is positive and signiﬁcant which is consistent with Blonigen (1997) who ﬁnds
that exchange rate depreciations induce entry through acquisitions in industries with more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. Number MAs, which was deﬁned as the number of Swedish M&As
within an industry in a country over the last three years, is positive and signiﬁcant, which
suggests that acquisitions occur where there is a supply of local targets.
Turning back to the double selection issue, the Wald test indicates that the correlation
between the error terms of the two probit equations is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This suggests that the model cannot be estimated with two independent probit equations
and that the decision of doing R&D may be biased by an endogenous entry mode choice.
The lambda for entry mode gives an estimate for the propensity to choose M&A or
greenﬁeld entry, accounting for the endogeneity of the R&D decision. These are not
signiﬁcant suggesting that there is no selection among acquired nor greenﬁeld aﬃliates
such that the aﬃliates of one type had a signiﬁcantly higher or lower R&D intensity than
the average. The lambda for R&D choice is signiﬁcant for acquired aﬃliates. Thus, there
is some evidence of selection such that acquired aﬃliates choosing to do R&D had a higher
R&D intensity as compared to the average in the case where all acquired aﬃliates had
chosen to do R&D. Finally, we ﬁnd that the F-test rejects a pooled model, which again
suggests that M&As and greenﬁeld entry should be seen as distinct choices made by ﬁrms.
286C o n c l u s i o n s
Using unique data on Swedish multinational ﬁrms, we investigate the R&D activities of
aﬃliates created by greenﬁe l di n v e s t m e n t sa n dt h o s ei n c o r p o r a t e db yt h ea c q u i s i t i o no f
local ﬁrms during the period 1970 to 1998. In contrast to the concerns of many policy-
makers, we ﬁnd that acquired aﬃliates are more likely to do R&D and have a higher level
of R&D intensity than greenﬁeld aﬃliates. There is no evidence that R&D in acquired
aﬃliates is terminated, or to a higher degree reduced over time than in aﬃliates created
through greenﬁeld entry. In terms of policy implications, these results show that restricting
cross-border acquisitions in order to favor greenﬁeld investments may lead to a reduction
in MNEs’ technology transfers to the host countries.
Another main ﬁnding is that the gap in aﬃliate R&D performance between the entry
m o d e si se x p l a i n e db yd i ﬀerences in parent, aﬃliate and country characteristics, but also by
t h ef a c tt h a ta ﬃliate R&D performance reacts diﬀerently to these characteristics. In fact,
we ﬁnd that R&D activities of acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates follow diﬀerent statistical
relationships. The latter result provides support for the new and fast-growing literature on
cross-border acquisitions, emphasizing that greenﬁeld entry and cross-border acquisitions
a r el i k e l yt ob ed r i v e nb yd i ﬀerent strategic motives.
In particular, cross-border acquisitions are likely to occur in order to seek assets and
generate R&D synergies, and that this motivation becomes more prevalent in 1990s. For
instance, we ﬁnd that R&D is sensitive to intellectual property right protection only in
acquired aﬃliates, which suggests that synergies in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge from asset
acquisitions require more rigorous protection. Our results also indicate that the degree of
host country specialization in R&D has a positive eﬀect on aﬃliate R&D, but again only
in the acquired aﬃliates.
Some limitations to our analysis should also be discussed. The nature of our data with
aﬃliates to Swedish ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta l l o wu st oa n a l y z et h ed e v e l o p m e n to fa ﬃliate R&D
activities before and after an ownership change. Thus, we investigate the post-acquisition
performance which is compared to the ”post-entry” behavior of aﬃliates created by green-
ﬁeld entry. If the higher propensity of doing R&D in acquired aﬃliates, as compared
29to aﬃliates created from greenﬁeld entry, is mainly due to complementaries or synergies
emerging from the acquisition, we would expect cross-border acquisitions to increase R&D
also when compared to the R&D performed in the target ﬁrm before an acquisition. Such
an analysis would provide a interesting comparison to our study. This is, however, left to
future research and would require other data sources.
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36A Additional tables
T a b l eA 1 .E n t r ym o d eo fF D I .
Year MA GI Total Share in
Number Total
1970 100 228 328 0.15
1978 154 227 381 0.18
1990 306 189 495 0.23
1994 346 202 548 0.25
1998 290 129 419 0.19
Total 1196 975 2171 1.00
Region
Europe 916 565 1481 0.68
North America 178 181 359 0.17
South America 53 118 171 0.08
Other Developing Countries 26 61 87 0.04
Other Developed Countries 23 50 73 0.03
Total 1196 975 2171 1.00
Industry
Resource-intensive 173 91 264 0.12
Labor-intensive 211 227 438 0.20
Scale-intensive 369 282 651 0.30
Diﬀerentiated Goods 350 260 610 0.28
Science Based 88 112 200 0.09
Total 1191 972 2163 1.00
37B The Oaxaca decomposition28
We follow Bergman et al. (2006) who generalize the linear Oaxaca decomposition to a non-
linear probit model. Let y denote the dependent variable and let x denote the independent
variables in (4) and (5). Then let E[y] denote the unconditional mean of y and let E[y|x]
be the conditional mean of y given x.N o t i n gt h a tE[y]=
Z
E[y|x]f(x)dx, where f(x) is
the marginal probability of x, we can write the diﬀerence in unconditional means between




















Thus, the diﬀerence in unconditional means between acquired aﬃliates and greenﬁeld
aﬃliates, EMA[y]−EGI[y] c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t oa n" explained part" and a "unexplained
part".T h e ﬁrst "explained part" is the part of the diﬀerence that can be explained by the
two entry modes having diﬀerent distributions of the explanatory variables x. The second
"unexplained part" i st h ep a r to ft h ed i ﬀerence that can be explained two entry modes
having diﬀerent conditional expectation functions, so that the underlying parameters in
the model that explains R&D performance diﬀers between the entry modes.














28See Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
38Noting that yi = DRDi in (4) and assuming that the zero conditional mean assumption








































=( 1 /N GI)
X
i∈GI DRDi,w h e r e
NMA and NGI are the number of observations of aﬃliates of each type and Φ(·) is the
cumulative normal distrubution.
Moreover, noting that yi =l o g RDi in (5) and assuming that the zero conditional

































NGI are the geometric means





GI ∗100 i st h ep e r c e n t a g ed i ﬀerence in geometric mean between acquired aﬃliates
and aﬃliates started from greenﬁeld entry.
The Oaxaca decomposition based on the diﬀerences in the R&D intensity (11), as
well as diﬀerences in the probability of doing R&D (10), over diﬀe r e n tt i m ep e r i o d sa r e
shown in table B1. The estimates are shown together with bootstrapped standard errors
derived from 1000 repetitions. We also performed the decomposition (10) when using a
linear probability model to estimate (4). In addition, we did a comparison of results when
using greenﬁeld aﬃliates, rather than acquired aﬃliates, as base group. Results from these
extensions did not qualitatively diﬀer from the ones in Table B1.
39C Main tables
40Table A2. Variable description.
Variable name Deﬁnition Source
Age ln(the number of years the aﬃliate has been IUI
part of the corporation)
Export aﬃliate exports to sales IUI
Size Aﬃliate ln(aﬃliate sales) IUI
Size Parent ln(total corporate sales) IUI
Prod Parent ln( total sales
total number of employees ∗ 100)I U I
RD Parent ln( R&D
total sales ∗ 100)I U I
RD Abroad
(total parent R&D−parent R&Di nS w e d e n )
total parent R&D IUI
Experience ln(the number of years since the ﬁrst R&D IUI
investment abroad)
Distance ln(the greater circle distance between capitals) Penn World Tables
GDP cap ln(GDP per capita) WDI, World Bank
GDP ln(GDP) WDI, World Bank
IPR Index of intellectual property rights Ginarte and Park (1997)
Exchange rate
localcurrency perUSDt
localcurrency perUSDt−5 Penn World Tables
Past number of MAs The number of M&As in the country IUI











where t i st h et i m ei n d e x ,j is the country index, h is
the industry index
41Table A3. Means of variables and test of equality of means.
Full Sample
Variable MA GI Diﬀerence
Age 10.235 25.614 -15.379***
Export 0.361 0.247 0.115***
Size Parent 5467.51 3927.66 1539.85***
Prod Parent 13.659 12.619 1.041**
RD Parent 2.722 3.930 -1.208***
RD Abroad 0.462 0.327 0.134***
Experience 21.949 31.925 -9.976***
Distance 2344.03 4117.30 -1773.27***
GDP 2.01e+12 1.98e+12 2.95e+10
GDP cap 25123.88 21289.88 3834.00***
IPR 4.044 3.734 0.309***
Size Aﬃliate 109.77 165.51 -55.74***
Number of obs. 560 314
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,**
at the ﬁve and * at the ten percent level.
42Table B1. The Oaxaca decomposition.
Probability of doing R&D using (4):































Obs MA 1135 242 893
Obs GI 928 436 492
R&D intensity using (5):



















GI 0.287*** 0.697*** 0.118
(0.094) (0.204) (0.104)
Obs MA 551 95 469
Obs GI 311 82 216
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve and * at the ten percent level.
The standard errors are obtained from a bootstrap with 1000 repetitions. Components may not sum to the
total diﬀerence due to rounding errors.
43Table 1. Pooled Heckman estimations.
First stage Second stage First Stage Probit Second Stage OLS
Dependent Variable Probit OLS Age≤88 <Age≤20 Age≤88 <Age≤20
MA_GI 0.347*** 0.376*** 0.410*** 0.316** 0.334** 0.537***
(0.077) (0.091) (0.127) (0.136) (0.164) (0.165)
Age -0.006** -2.3E-04 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
Export 0.371*** 0.951*** 0.539*** 0.488* 0.718*** 1.198***
(0.124) (0.141) (0.180) (0.231) (0.206) (0.236)
Size Parent -0.247*** -0.109*** -0.245*** -0.151*** -0.098*** -0.045
(0.026) (0.021) (0.038) (0.048) (0.029) (0.037)
Prod Parent 0.171 0.267* 0.345* -0.048 0.507** -0.180
(0.125) (0.143) (0.182) (0.260) (0.196) (0.262)
RD Parent 0.414*** 0.728*** 0.491*** 0.379*** 0.827*** 0.874***
(0.047) (0.866) (0.064) (0.085) (0.085) (0.132)
RD Abroad 1.201*** 1.491*** 1.583*** 0.636** 2.136*** 0.973***
(0.149) (0.196) (0.220) (0.285) (0.278) (0.317)
Experience 0.017*** 0.003 0.005* 0.012*** -0.007** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance -0.235*** -0.404*** -0.465*** 0.070 -0.424*** -0.162
(0.088) (0.107) (0.152) (0.215) (0.158) (0.217)
GDP -0.035 0.181 -0.047 -0.090 0.144** 0.060
(0.038) (0.042) (0.058) (0.075) (0.064) (0.073)
GDP cap -0.063 -0.023** -0.112 0.142 -0.131 0.446
(0.131) (0.172) (0.246) (0.407) (0.246) (0.345)
IPR 0.250** 0.369** 0.135
(0.101) (0.167) (0.199)
Size Aﬃliate 0.412*** 0.420*** 0.372***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.060)
Labor intensive 0.030 0.256* 0.114 -0.001 0.067 0.590*
(0.129) (0.145) (0.192) (0.247) (0.200) (0.288)
Scale intensive -0.109 0.074 -0.090 0.127 0.102 0.739***
(0.116) (0.140) (0.160) (0.235) (0.176) (0.276)
Diﬀerentiated goods 0.286** 0.745*** 0.509*** 0.341 0.733*** 1.403***
(0.22) (0.143) (0.172) (0.237) (0.188) (0.284)
Science based -0.054 1.003*** -0.082 0.293 0.663*** 1.679***
(0.168) (0.184) (0.266) (0.309) (0.252) (0.656)
Constant 1.076 -4.494 0.100 -1.663 -4.823 -9.280**
(1.610) (2.009) (2.886) (4.424) (3.054) (4.094)
Lambda 1.442*** 1.243*** 2.061***
(0.160) (0.208) (0.333)
No. obs 2063 862 970 595 370 272
Pseudo R2/R2 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.43
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve
and * at the ten percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
44Table 2. Separate Heckman estimations.
First Stage Probit Second Stage OLS
Dependent Variable MA GI Diﬀerence . MA GI Diﬀerence
Age -0.007 -0.015*** 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 3.3E-05
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Export 0.478*** 0.072 0.406 0.920*** 0.899*** 0.021
(0.) (0.866) (0.260) (0.160) (0.286) (0.325)
Size Parent -0.197*** -0.303*** 0.106* -0.051** -0.198*** 0.147***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.058) (0.022) (0.050) (0.054)
Prod Parent -0.164 0.413** -0.578* -0.098 0.549** -0.647**
(0.199) (0.168) (0.260) (0.156) (0.279) (0.317)
RD Parent 0.553*** 0.260*** 0.293*** 0.808*** 0.732*** 0.076
(0.065) (0.073) (0.098) (0.081) (0.115) (0.140)
RD Abroad 1.016*** 1.365*** -0.350 1.387*** 1.356*** 0.031
(0.195) (0.247) (0.314) (0.199) (0.416) (0.458)
Experience 0.004 0.034*** -0.030*** -0.004* 0.013* -0.017**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Distance -0.357** -0.080 -0.276 -0.196 -0.341* 0.145
(0.146) (0.133) (0.197) (0.123) (0.187) (0.222)
GDP 0.031 -0.086 0.117 0.111** 0.242*** -0.131
(0.054) (0.059) (0.080) (0.048) (0.072) (0.086)
GDP cap 0.027 -0.073 0.100 0.652*** -0.370* 1.022***
(0.261) (0.159) (0.305) (0.211) (0.223) (0.306)
IPR 0.447*** 0.138 0.309
(0.163) (0.152) (0.223)
Size Aﬃliate 0.448*** 0.403*** 0.045
(0.045) (0.060) (0.074)
Labor intensive 0.211 -0.265 0.475* 0.464*** -0.031 0.495
(0.183) (0.194) (0.267) (0.175) (0.251) (0.304)
Scale intensive -0.100 -0.172 0.072 0.285* -0.252 0.538*
(0.154) (0.182) (0.238) (0.162) (0.262) (0.306)
Diﬀerentiated goods 0.432*** 0.046 0.385 0.938*** 0.436 0.502
(0.166) (0.190) (0.252) (0.171) (0.268) (0.316)
Science based -0.024 -0.123 0.099 1.159*** 0.816*** 0.343
(0.245) (0.254) (0.353) (0.225) (0.309) (0.380)
Lambda 1.494*** 1.409*** -0.152
(0.177) (0.312) (0.357)
Constant -1.336 2.212 -3.549 -10.230*** -2.700 -7.530*
(2.976) (2.288) (3.753) (2.595) (2.928) (3.899)
No. obs 1135 928 551 311
Pseudo R2/R2 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.40
Wald-test/F test 71.53*** 2.16***
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve and * at the ten
percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
45Table 3. Separate Heckman estimations for the 1970’s.
Dependent First Stage Probit Second Stage OLS
Variable Pooled MA GI Diﬀ.P o o l e dM A G I D i ﬀ.
MA_GI 0.457*** 0.730***
(0.154) (0.210)
Age -0.006 2.30E-04 -0.012* 0.013 -0.003 -0.009** -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Export 0.230 0.008 7.35E-04 0.007 1.502*** 1.638*** 1.161* 0.478
(0.279) (0.494) (0.358) (0.610) (0.338) (0.545) (0.662) (0.858)
Size Parent -0.438*** -0.453*** -0.479*** 0.026 -0.334*** -0.172 -0.443*** 0.270
(0.070) (0.137) (0.109) (0.175) (0.077) (0.127) (0.109) (0.167)
Prod Parent 0.096 -1.046** 0.276 -1.322** -0.785** -1.460** -0.520 -0.940
(0.225) (0.435) (0.286) (0.520) (0.377) (0.559) (0.510) (0.756)
RD Parent 0.208** 0.574*** 0.047 0.527*** 0.316* 0.494 0.269 0.225
(0.082) (0.161) (0.102) (0.191) (0.164) (0.339) (0.244) (0.417)
RD Abroad 2.356*** 3.138*** 2.800*** 0.339 2.209*** 1.470 2.487*** -1.016
(0.383) (0.673) (0.693) (0.965) (0.548) (0.961) (0.781) (1.237)
Experience 0.026*** 0.002 0.037*** -0.035*** 0.015** 0.005 0.022** -0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Distance 0.258 0.432 0.187 0.245 -0.786*** -0.203 -0.991** 0.788
(0.205) (0.425) (0.256) (0.496) (0.286) (0.483) (0.417) (0.637)
GDP -0.185 0.098 -0.309** 0.407** 0.174* 0.080 0.190 -0.111
(0.089) (0.148) (0.123) (0.192) (0.092) (0.146) (0.128) (0.194)
GDP cap 0.546* 1.366** 0.319 1.047 -0.886* -0.047 -1.082** 1.035
(0.290) (0.660) (0.326) (0.736) (0.459) (0.915) (0.539) (1.060)
IPR 0.119 -0.402 0.396 -0.799
(0.217) (0.399) (0.287) (0.491)
Size Aﬃliate 0.489*** 0.646*** 0.500*** 0.147
(0.079) (0.141) (0.129) (0.191)
Labor int. 0.230 0.954* -0.041 0.995* 0.880* 0.784 1.068 0.284
(0.260) (0.499) (0.337) (0.602) (0.436) (0.456) (0.680) (0.819)
Scale int. 0.016 0.224 -0.105 0.329 0.230 0.807 -0.073 0.880
(0.234) (0.375) (0.292) (0.475) (0.378) (0.548) (0.591) (0.806)
Diﬀerentiat. 0.824*** 1.568*** 0.602** 0.966* 1.821*** 1.641*** 1.750*** -0.109
(0.226) (0.405) (0.300) (0.503) (0.401) (0.561) (0.623) (0.839)
Science 0.516** 0.995* 0.432 0.564 2.183*** 1.770*** 2.478*** -0.708
(0.294) (0.523) (0.402) (0.659) (0.530) (0.656) (0.927) (1.131)
Lambda 0.921*** 0.652** 1.087*** -0.436
(0.251) (0.323) (0.360) (0.484)
Constant -3.288 -18.249** 2.185 -20.435** -8.378 -0.722 11.571 -12.293
(3.501) (8.313) (4.247) (9.324) (5.294) (11.694) (5.997) (13.113)
No. obs 678 236 436 672 177 82 95 177
Pseudo R2/R2 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.55
Wald test/F test 55.40*** 1.50*
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve and * at the ten
percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
46Table 4. Separate Heckman estimations for the 1990’s.
Dependent First Stage Probit Second Stage OLS
Variable Pooled MA GI Diﬀ.P o o l e d M A G I D i ﬀ.
MA_GI 0.304*** 0.288***
(0.096) (0.099)
Age -0.009** -0.009* -0.019*** -0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Export 0.413*** 0.567*** 0.098 0.468 0.790*** 0.794*** 0.913** -0.118
(0.142) (0.188) (0.238) (0.303) (0.152) (0.174) (0.352) (0.387)
Size Parent -0.206*** -0.187*** -0.251*** 0.063 -0.077*** -0.052** -0.123** 0.071
(0.028) (0.036) (0.055) (0.066) (0.020) (0.023) (0.053) (0.057)
Prod Parent 0.111 -0.020** 0.348 -0.368 0.335** 0.113 -0.524* -0.411
(0.163) (0.235) (0.236) (0.333) (0.146) (0.163) (0.297) (0.334)
RD Parent 0.472*** 0.573*** 0.355*** 0.219* 0.886*** 0.911*** 0.861*** 0.050
(0.057) (0.075) (0.105) (0.128) (0.067) (0.085) (0.123) (0.121)
RD Abroad 1.025*** 0.858*** 1.217*** -0.359 1.506*** 1.426*** 1.348*** 0.078
(0.167) (0.210) (0.289) (0.357) (0.188) (0.209) (0.407) (0.451)
Experience 0.013*** 0.003 0.032*** -0.030*** 1.67E-04 -0.006** 0.012 -0.017**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Distance -0.410*** -0.413*** -0.208 -0.205 -0.391*** -0.191 -0.257 0.065
(0.106) (0.159) (0.180) (0.240) (0.105) (0.130) (0.213) (0.247)
GDP 0.011 0.025 -0.011 0.036 0.191*** 0.105** 0.342*** -0.237**
(0.044) (0.062) (0.073) (0.095) (0.044) (0.051) (0.085) (0.098)
GDP cap 0.286* -0.102 -0.336 0.234 0.161 0.717*** -0.320* 1.037***
(0.161) (0.287) (0.205) (0.353) (0.143) (0.212) (0.188) (0.185)
IPR 0.356*** 0.582*** 0.175 0.407
(0.124) (0.182) (0.197) (0.268)
Size Aﬃliate 0.419*** 0.430*** 0.407*** 0.022
(0.039) (0.049) (0.077) (0.091)
Labor int. 0.058 0.185 -0.333 0.517 0.296** 0.414** -0.159 0.573*
(0.158) (0.210) (0.265) (0.337) (0.148) (0.188) (0.243) (0.305)
Scale int. 0.143 -0.151 -0.290 0.139 0.013 0.142 -0.389 0.531*
(0.140) (0.177) (0.246) (0.303) (0.142) (0.175) (0.255) (0.250)
Diﬀerentiat. 0.215 0.394** -0.240 0.633* 0.663*** 0.831*** 0.001 0.830**
(0.152) (0.193) (0.269) (0.331) (0.149) (0.187) (0.278) (0.332)
Science 0.186 -0.187 -0.428 0.241 0.885*** 0.979*** 0.513 0.466
(0.211) (0.296) (0.341) (0.451) (0.191) (0.242) (0.324) (0.401)
Lambda 1.635*** 1.593** 1.950*** -0.358
(0.167) (0.197) (0.361) (0.405)
Constant 2.784 0.193 3.093 -2.900 -7.043*** -10.971*** -7.338 -3.634
(2.045) (3.310) (3.050) (4.499) (1932.) (2.701) (3.30) (4.228)
No. obs 1385 893 436 1385 685 469 216 685
Pseudo R2/R2 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.46 0.41
Wald test/F test 77.53*** 1.71**
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve and * at the ten
percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
47Table 5. Separate Heckman estimations for the 1990’s controlling RCA in RD.
First Stage Probit Second Stage OLS
Dependent Variable MA GI Diﬀerence . MA GI Diﬀerence
Age -0.005 -0.017** 0.012 0.001 -0.008 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Export 0.437* 0.0146 0.291 0.789*** 0.445 0.343
(0.260) (0.339) (0.427) (0.253) (0.508) (0.554)
Size Parent -0.159*** -0.290*** 0.131 -0.012 -0.152** 0.139*
(0.046) (0.074) (0.087) (0.031) (0.070) (0.075)
Prod Parent -0.143 0.545 -0.687 0.287 0.768* -0.481
(0.287) (0.341) (0.446) (0.232) (0.400) (0.452)
RD Parent 0.658*** 0.487*** 0.171 0.919*** 1.016*** -0.096
(0.108) (0.129) (0.168) (0.128) (0.159) (0.201)
RD Abroad 0.980*** 1.269*** -0.289 1.479*** 1.798*** -0.320
(0.273) (0.383) (0.470) (0.278) (0.476) (0.540)
Experience 0.001 0.026*** -0.026*** -0.006** 0.008 -0.014
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance -0.198 -0.442 -0.244 -0.123 -0.106 -0.016
(0.312) (0.413) (0.517) (0.275) (0.472) (0.534)
GDP 0.014 -0.012 0.026 0.111 0.204 -0.093
(0.124) (0.157) (0.201) (0.125) (0.177) (0.212)
GDP cap 0.449 -1.151 1.600 0.993** -0.267 1.260
(0.553) (0.844) (1.008) (0.444) (0.846) (0.934)
IPR 0.635** 0.303 0.332
(0.261) (0.293) (0.392)
RCA 0.089*** -0.005 0.095*** 0.006** -0.002 0.007
(0.030) (0.005) (0.030) (0.003) (0.112) (0.012)
Size Aﬃliate 0.412*** 0.420*** -0.008
(0.058) (0.106) (0.121)
Labor intensive 0.288 -0.484 0.772* 0.166 -0.208 0.374
(0.269) (0.323) (0.420) (0.261) (0.264) (0.367)
Scale intensive -0.004 -0.433 0.429 0.113 -0.655 0.543
(0.227) (0.314) (0.387) (0.242) (0.296) (0.377)
Diﬀerentiated goods 0.469** -0.400 0.870** 0.431* -0.332 0.743*
(0.237) (0.325) (0.403) (0.256) (0.296) (0.387)
Science based -0.102 -0.527 0.425 0.748** 0.219 0.529
(0.379 (0.446) (0.585) (0.320) (0.364) (0.479)
Lambda 1.560*** 1.797*** -0.237
(0.252) (0.409) (0.470)
Constant -6.788 12.270 -19.058* -14.807*** -5.594 -9.540
(5.902) (9.091) (10.829) (4.954) (9.277) (10.293)
No. obs 556 276 298 133
R2/Pseudo R2 0.27 0.30 0.38 0.50
Wald-test/F-test 40.79*** 1.47*
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve and * at the ten
percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
48Table 6. Biprobit estimations.
Dependent First Stage Biprobit Second Stage OLS
Variable MA_G1 RD MA GI Diﬀ
Age -0.135*** -0.051 -0.039 0.263 -0.302
(0.034) (0.035) (0.044) (0.232) (0.193)
Export -0.184 0.519*** 0.561** 0.336 0.236
(0.212) (0.193) (0.263) (0.635) (0.594)
Size Parent 0.213*** -0.224*** -0.066 -0.439 0.371
(0.034) (0.041) (0.055) (0.281) (0.241)
Prod Parent -0.809*** 0.294 0.408 2.480** -2.133**
(0.193) (0.203) (0.314) (1.005) (0.895)
RD Parent -0.186*** 0.554*** 0.801*** 1.738*** -0.735*
(0.069) (0.072) (0.119) (0.482) (0.419)
RD Abroad 0.612** 1.732*** 1.980*** 1.313 0.684
(0.248) (0.248) (0.384) (0.885) (0.835)
Experience -0.004 0.002 -0.108*** -0.007 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.014)
Distance -0.067 -0.467*** -0.235 -0.699 0.499
(0.140) (0.170) (0.183) (0.729) (0.636)
GDP -0.022 0.036 0.051 0.220 -0.178
(0.059) (0.064) (0.070) (0.273) (0.238)
GDP cap 0.006 0.036 0.323 -1.062 1.236*









Lambda MA/GI -0.138 -2.804
(0.598) (1.788)
Lambda R&D 1.069*** 0.634
(0.273) (0.620)
Constant 0.503 -0.643 -4.408*** 4.750
(2.091) (3.321) (3.344) (10.000)
No. obs 796 241 57 298
R2 0.45 0.50 0.46
Wald test of rho=0 Prob >chi2 = 0.0006
F test 2.60****
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve
and * at the ten percent level. Time-, industry and region dummies are included.
49